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HUME AND EDWARDS ON 'WHY IS THERE SOMETHING RATHER 
THAN NOTHING?'  
Michael B. Burke 
There is no known proof that the physical universe had a beginning. For 
this reason, if no other, proponents of the Cosmological Argument are barred 
from asking, 'What was the cause of the first physical event?'. What they 
can do instead is to make the unfavourable assumption that there has been 
an infinite succession of physical events and then ask, 'Why is it that instead 
of there having been no physical events, there has been an infinite succession 
of physical events?'. Those who wish to avoid supernaturalistic explanations 
generally have given one of the following three answers. 
1. That there has been an infinite succession of physical events is a fact 
for which there is no explanation. 
Some who take this position would add that the fact in question is not the 
sort of fact for which an explanation is possible. This is the line taken by 
Bertrand Russell in his broadcast debate with F. C. Coppleston.1 
2. There having been an infinite succession of physical events is explained 
by the fact that the physical universe (or a component of it) exists as 
a matter of logical necessity. It is the sort of being which could not 
not exist. 
This answer is available both to those who hold that nature is divine (i.e., 
pantheists) and to those who do not. 
3. For every member of the infinite succession of past physical events, 
there is an explanation of why that event occurred. Collectively, these 
explanations constitute an xplanation of why there has been an infinite 
succession of physical events. 
This is a position that has come to be associated with David Hume and Paul 
Edwards, and I will follow William Rowe 2 in calling it the Hume-Edwards 
position. The merits of this position will be the subject of my paper. 
As a preliminary, let's take a quick look at some of the pertinent passages 
from Hume and Edwards. In Part IX of the Dialogues, Demea remarks: 
The question is still reasonable why this particular succession of causes 
existed from eternity, and not any other succession or no succession at all. 3 
Printed in John Hick, ed. Classical and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, 
2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970). See pp. 288-289. 
2 William Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 
p. 153. 
3 Richard H. Popkin, ed. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and the Posthumous Essay
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), p. 55. 
355 
356 'Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing?' 
Cleanthes replies, in part: 
In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that 
which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is the 
difficulty? But the whole, you say, wants a cause . . .  Did I show you the 
particular cause of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of 
matter, I should think it very unreasonable should you afterwards ask me 
what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in 
explaining the cause of the parts. 4
Paul Edwards takes the same line. After discussing his well-known case 
of the five Eskimos in New York, Edwards concludes: 
• . . the theists have at least one brute fact on their hands, namely God. 
Those who adopt Buchner's formulation [that the universe is necessary] 
also have one brute fact on their hands, namely 'the universe'. Only the 
position I have been supporting dispenses with brute facts altogether: 
Now certainly it would be pleasant, at least for those of us who are 
naturalistically inclined, to think that cosmology can dispense simultaneously 
with supernatural beings, necessary existents, and brute facts• (I don't wish 
to say that the existence of a necessary being would be a brute fact. I prefer 
to say that its existence would be explained by its being the sort of being 
which could not not exist.) It will be my contention, however, that Hume 
and Edwards have not succeeded in showing how this can be done. In section 
I, I will argue that Hume and Edwards have failed to explain why there always 
has existed a physical universe. In section II, I will reinforce my case with 
what is, I believe, a vivid counterexample to their style of explanation. 
I 
Instead of focusing on the exact question raised by Demea, I want to 
consider a slightly different question. Continuing to suppose that the physical 
universe has existed for an infinite amount of time, I want to ask this. 
Q Why is it that matter always has existed? 
Two preliminaries: (1) We will be using the term 'matter' to avoid the tedium 
that would be involved in frequent use of the term 'mass-energy', but it is 
mass-energy that really will be meant. (2) It will simplify our discussion to 
assume that time is absolute and that he past would be infinite even if the 
age of the universe were finite. 6 This will make it easier to formulate and 
discuss Hume-Edwards style explanations, but neither the style of explanation 
nor my criticism of it requires this assumption. 
Presumably, a supporter of the Hume-Edwards approach would answer 
4 Ibid., p. 56. I am following Edwards and Rowe in taking this passage to be an expression 
of position 3. No doubt other interpretations are possible. 
5 Paul Edwards, 'The Cosmological Argument', in Donald R. Burrill, ed. The Cosmological 
Arguments (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 122-123. 
6 If time is relational, and if it should be the case that matter (mass-energy) is the only thing 
capable of undergoing change that there logically could be, and if 'always' is interpreted 
'hypothetically', then matter's 'always' having existed would be logically necessary. 
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Q as follows. 'For  every past t ime t, 7 there is an explanat ion of  why matter 
existed at t. (It is explained by the fact that matter  existed at a t ime earlier 
than t -combined  with the principle o f  the conservation of  matter.)  
Collectively, these explanat ions explain why it is that matter existed at every 
past t ime. '  
To help us evaluate this answer, let's formulate the fact, F, to be explained 
and the proposed explanans, E. 
F Matter  always has existed. 
The explanans for F is said to be constituted by a set of  explanantia.  One 
member of the set is the following proposit ion: Matter existed at a time earlier 
than 3 p.m.,  1/1/1900; and matter is conserved. Collectively, then, the 
explanant ia mount  to this. 8 
E For  every past t ime t, matter  existed at a t ime earl ier than t; and matter 
is conserved. 
The question is whether E explains F. It is clear, of  course, that E logically 
implies F, but I will argue that E does not explain F. At  most, E explains 
a 'part '  of  F. Consider the fol lowing proposit ions.  
N It is not the case that matter never  has existed. 
S It is not the case that matter  has existed j us t  some of  the time. 
Now F is equivalent to the conjunct ion of  N and S, and I am willing to allow 
that E explains S. (The explanatory force resides entirely in E's second 
conjunct.)  But since E does not explain N (although it logically implies it), 
and since, in seeking an explanat ion for F, we are at least as interested in 
an explanat ion for N as for S, E cannot be said to explain F. It explains 
only a part of  F. 
The argument may be laid out as fol lows. 
Premiss 1 F is logically equivalent o the conjunct ion of  N and S. 
Premiss 2 In seeking an explanat ion for F, we are at least as interested in 
an explanat ion for N as for S. 
Premiss 3 (At least in the present context) E does not explain N. 
Premiss 4 For  any proposit ions W,X ,Y ,Z :  I f  X is logically equivalent o 
the conjunct ion of  Y and Z, and if, in seeking an explanat ion 
for X, we are at least as interested in an explanat ion for Y as 
for Z, then W explains X only i f  W explains Y. 
Conclusion E does not explain F. 9 
7 Since the present moment belongs to the period of time during which matter 'has' existed, 
it would be more fitting, though cumbersome, to say, 'For every past andpresent time t'. 
Instead, we will simply et it be understood that here and elsewhere, this is what we mean. 
s The sense in which the set, E', of explanantia ' mounts to' E is this: Necessarily, E is true 
if and only if all members of S are true. I will be assuming that E' explains F only if E explains 
F. But if this assumption should be questioned, I would drop if and identify the explanans as E'.
E' IP: (3t)(t is a past time, and P is the proposition which asserts that matter existed at 
a time earlier than t and that matter is conserved.) 1 
The only reason for identifying the explanans as E is that E is more easily held in mind. When 
we later come to the third premiss of my argument, the reader should note that that premiss 
would be at least as plausible if 'E' ' were substituted for 'E'. 
9 Anyone doubting that Hume and Edwards are committed to denying this conclusion may 
substitute 'E' ' for 'E'. (See note 8.) 
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The first premiss is true as a matter of logic, the second as a matter of 
empirical fact. The third and fourth call for discussion. Let's begin with the 
fourth. 
It might be thought that premiss 4 is unnecessarily weak, that we could 
appeal to this stronger (and simpler) principle. 
For any propositions W,X,Y: If  X entails Y, then W explains X only if 
W explains Y. 
But here is a case which appears to be counterexemplary. On learning that 
Fred, our hitherto healthy neighbor, collapsed and died at his 100th birthday 
party, we ask for an explanation. We are told that one of Fred's old girl friends 
was brought in for his 100th birthday and that Fred became overexcited and 
suffered, in consequence, a massive heart attack. Now this explanation, one 
would think, may be quite satisfactory. It seems clear, however, that the 
explanans (even if supplemented with laws sufficient o permit he deduction 
of the explanandum) does not explain the following logical consequence of 
the explanandum: Fred reached the age of 100. Since, we will suppose, Fred's 
having reached 100 is not an aspect (consequence) of the explanandum for 
which we were desiring an explanation, we may be satisfied (and, it may be 
claimed, the explanation is satisfactory), even though this consequence has 
not been explained. 
Premiss 4, of course, is protected from this sort of counterexample by its 
second 'if' clause. Since the premiss is highly plausible, and since I can think 
of no way in which it might be challenged, I am content o let it stand as 
an ultimate premiss of my argument. 
Let's look now at premiss 3. The way in which this premiss might be 
established is by reference to some necessary condition of explanatory 
satisfactoriness. Unfortunately, it is far from clear what the necessary 
conditions of explanatory satisfactoriness are. All would agree, I believe, that 
the explanans must not be identical with the explanandum. But I know of 
nothing else that is universally agreed to be necessary (apart from things that 
are trivially necessary, such as that the explanation be satisfactory.) (Of 
course, no one holds that the non-identity of explanandum and explanans 
is a sufficient condition.) Having no hopes of establishing the necessity of
some condition whose necessity has not hitherto been established, I plan to 
provide for premiss 3 support of a decidedly more modest character. First, 
I will note that the putative xplanation of N by E fails to meet a condition 
often held to be necessary. Second, I will show that even on the relatively 
permissive pragmatic oncept of explanation, there is no apparent reason to 
count E a satisfactory answer to our question about N. Afterwards we'll 
consider where this leaves us. 
On deductive-nomological theories of explanation, the explanans 
standardly is required to contain a law that actually is needed for the deduction 
of the explanandum. ~°Since N follows from E's left conjunct, and since, 
1o cf. Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim. 'Studies in he Logic of Explanation', reprinted in 
Carl Hernpel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 248. 
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presumably, the latter is not a law, deductive-nomological theorists can be 
expected to accept premiss 3. (The violation is even clearer when N is explained 
by E', which I regard as the official explanans. [See note 8.]) 
On pragmatic theories,ll an explanation may be satisfactory in one context 
and unsatisfactory in another. The relevant features of the 'context' generally 
are the beliefs, interests, attitudes, and/or  other psychological states of the 
intended audience. If, in a certain context, an explanation can be expected 
to produce a sense of understanding, or at least reduce the felt need for 
explanation, then relatively few additional conditions may need to be met 
in order for the explanation to be judged, by proponents of some pragmatic 
theory, satisfactory in that context. I want, therefore, to ask whether there 
is some realistic context in which an audience wondering about N might be 
satisfied by E. So far as I can imagine, the only such context is one in which 
the audience had assumed the contradictory of S. For an audience who had 
not thought of the possibility of F, or who had assumed F not to be a 
possibility, the truth of N would call out loudly for explanation. It would 
mean that some finite number of years ago, the physical universe suddenly 
popped into existence. If  this audience were then persuaded that N is true 
by virtue of the truth of F (which is entailed by E), rather than of the 
contradictory of S, the audience might well cease to find N so surprising. 
In any event, the present context is not of this sort. Our question about N 
arose not in a context in which we were assuming the contradictory of S, 
but in one in which we had all along been supposing F. In the context of 
our discussion, there is no apparent way to understand how an audience 
wondering about N could be satisfied by E. 
Although the preceding two paragraphs provide some support for premiss 
3, the principal basis for accepting this premiss is its own plausibility. Given 
the sorry state of explanation theory, it is not possible to exhibit premiss 
3 as the consequence of universally accepted principles. But the failure of 
E to explain N seems ufficiently clear that any theory giving a different result 
would be seriously embarrassed. 
Where does this leave us? My argument has four premisses, none of which 
has here been proven. But, of course, all arguments rest ultimately on 
unproven premisses. Mine are highly plausible; there is no apparent reason 
not to accept them; and to my knowledge, no one has ever denied them. 
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that he present paper does not 
belong to that genre of philosophical writing in which the object is to provide 
a theoretical basis for accepting something already universally or generally 
accepted (such as that cruelty is wrong or  that the sun will rise tomorrow). 
The object is to persuade the reader of the probable incorrectness of what 
I take to be a widely held belief: that Hume and Edwards have shown how 
cosmology can dispense simultaneously with supernatural beings, necessary 
existents, and unexplainable facts. It is now up to anyone still wishing to 
~t Cf. Peter Gardenfors, 'A Pragmatic Approach to Explanations,' Philosophy of Science, 47 
(1980), pp. 404-423 and Peter Achinstein, The Nature of Explanation (New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1983). 
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hold that position to say which of my premisses he proposes to reject and 
to provide some way of making this rejection palatable. 
Before closing this section, I want to add three points of clarification. (1) 
I have claimed that F is not explained by E. I have not, of course, claimed 
that F must have an explanation. Perhaps Russell's position is the correct 
one. (2) I have not disputed the adequacy of the individual explanations. 
For example, I have not objected to the proposed explanation of the fact 
that matter existed at 3 p.m., 1/1/1900. I have not claimed that because the 
explanans i itself in need of explanation, it fails to explain its explanandum. 
(3) I certainly agree with Hume that to explain the existence of each member 
of a collection of twenty particles is to explain the xistence of the 'whole 
twenty.' For the relevant difference between that case and cases such as 
explaining F by E, the reader is referred to a very helpful discussion by 
William Rowe. ~z 
II 
In this section, I will reinforce the case against Hume and Edwards by 
providing what is, I believe, a clear counterexample to the principle on which 
they rely. 
Here is the version of their principle which I wish to challenge. 
P For any set S of times and any physical object x: If for every time 
belonging to S there is an explanation of why x exists at that time, these 
explanations, taken collectively, explain why it is that x exists at every 
time belonging to S. 
In section I, what we were supposing was that there always has been matter. 
If we had supposed that there is some physical object (an elementary particle, 
say) which always has existed, and if we had challenged the Hume-Edwards 
theorist to explain that (which ought not to be more difficult), presumably 
he would have needed to appeal to P- instant iat ing 'S' with the set of all 
past (and present) times. 
My counterexample to P will depend on the assumption, which is standard 
in mathematical physics, that time is continuous. Actually, I need only the 
weaker assumption that continuous time is a logical possibility. It is widely 
conceded nowadays that none of the a priori arguments of Zeno, including 
the paradox of plurality, succeeds in disproving the continuity of space and 
time. 13 So far as I am aware, these are the only important arguments against 
the possibility of continuous time. I must acknowledge, however, that my 
example will be acceptable only to those who will grant that time is, or could 
have been, continuous. 
Suppose that five minutes ago, to our great astonishment, a full grown 
duck suddenly sprang into existence on the table in front of us. Suppose, 
furthermore, that there was nofirst moment at which the duck existed, but 
12 Rowe, op. cit., pp. 151-159. 
~3 Cf. Wesley Salmon, Space, Time, andMotion, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1980), Chapter 2. 
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rather a last moment at which it had yet to exist. That is, suppose there was 
a time t such that the duck did not exist at t, had not existed at any time 
earlier than t, but has existed at every time since t. 
Such an episode would be similar in one relevant respect o what happens 
when an object begins to move. It is an axiom of kinematics that velocity 
varies continuously with time. If so, then when an object begins to move 
there is no first moment at which the object is in motion, but rather a last 
moment at which it is at rest. 
Assuming that the bizarre episode I have described is a logical possibility, 
it provides a counterexample to P. Here's why. 
Let's use 'to' as a name for the last time at which the duck had yet to exist, 
and let's use 'I' for the set of times belonging to the interval between to and 
now, exclusive of to. I, then, contains all and only the times at which the 
duck has existed. 
Now for every time t belonging to I, there is an explanation of why the 
duck exists at t. The explanation is that the duck existed at a time t' earlier 
than t (but later than to), and it was only to be expected that a healthy duck 
would endure throughout the brief period between t' and t. If the duck had 
existed at to (but not earlier), there would have been a question to which we 
would have had no ready answer: Why did the duck exist at to? But since 
for every time at which the duck has existed, there was an earlier time at 
which the duck existed, there is no time such that we lack an explanation 
of the duck's existence at that time. 
Clearly, though, and contrary to P, these explanations, taken collectively, 
do not explain why it is that instead of having existed at no time since to, 
the duck has existed at every time since to. Perhaps it is the work of God. 
Perhaps there is a naturalistic explanation. Perhaps there simply is no 
explanation. In any case, the individual explanations do not explain it. (If 
they did, then if God appeared and informed us that there had been no first 
moment at which the duck existed, and if he subsequently reappeared to reveal 
that he was responsible for the episode, all of which would seem to be logically 
possible, then at God's second appearance we would not be learning an 
explanation for anything for which we lacked one. But clearly we would be.) 
I want to reply to one possible objection. It may be said that when an object 
comes into existence, there are times at which it is indeterminate whether 
the object has yet begun to exist. Think of the gradual assembly of a car. 
Due to the imprecision of our criteria of carhood, there are times at which 
it is neither true nor false that the car has begun to exist. Therefore, it is 
true neither that there is a first moment ~tt which the car exists nor that there 
is a last moment at which it has yet o exist. 
The reply is as follows. It may well be true that in most, or even all actual 
cases, there are times at which it is indeterminate whether the object in 
question has begun to exist. This is due to the fact that objects typically come 
into existence as a result of the joining of a number of pre-existing parts. 
Since different parts join at different imes, and since there generally is at 
least a small interval of time during which it is indeterminate whether a given 
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part has yet joined, there is no precise time of origin. But none of this applies 
to an object which, together with all of its parts, pops into existence fully 
formed. Only if this latter were a logical impossibility would my argument 
be blocked. 
So, I believe we should reject he principle on which Hume and Edwards 
rely. In addition to the argument of section I, we have the duck 
counterexample of section II. 
Why, then, is it the case (if, indeed, it is) that there always has existed 
a physical universe? If we reject the answer of Hume and Edwards, three 
possibilities remain. There is a supernatural being, the physical universe xists 
as a matter of logical necessity, or the existence of the universe is a fact for 
which there is no explanation. TM 
Indiana University Received October 1983 
14 1 am indebted to my colleague Dr Ira Schnall for valuable suggestions and to an anonymous 
referee for this Journal for help in specifying E' and, especially, for telling criticism of 
arguments contained in an earlier draft. 
